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1. Introduction 
Abenomics advanced a policy mix of bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy, and a growth 
strategy for stimulating private investment, which were called the “three arrows.” Corporate 
governance reforms were positioned as one of the most important issues for the growth strategy, 
the third arrow. Policy measures to achieve growth through corporate governance reforms are 
not unique to Abenomics. The pursuit of corporate governance reforms from the standpoint of 
promoting growth became a global trend following the global financial crisis (Kay, 2012; 
OECD, 2012). However, in United States, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe, the 
focus of attention was the problem that shareholder pressure was so strong that firms engaged 
in excessive risk-taking or myopic business practices.
1
 In contrast, the central issue in 
corporate governance reforms in Japan is that the existing system has made firms take 
risk-averse or conservative approaches to business management because the influence of 
shareholder (employee) remain too weak (strong). 
The basic idea of Abenomics was to induce greater efficiency in corporate management in 
the following ways. First, the Japanese Stewardship Code (JSC) encouraged institutional 
investors to participate in corporate management and actively exercise their voting rights. 
Second, the Corporate Governance Code (CGC) promoted the appointment of independent 
outside directors, adoption of a performance-related compensation system, and reduction of 
relational shareholdings. Third, reforms of corporate governance systems encouraged greater 
risk-taking by firms. 
To what extent did the corporate governance reforms under Abenomics, which centered 
on the implementation of the two codes, affect corporate governance systems in Japan? These 
systems had already been changing since the 1997 banking crisis in Japan. Japanese firms were 
once commonly characterized by the main bank system, cross-shareholding, and boards 
consisting of internally appointed directors. However, corporate reorganization efforts after the 
banking crisis separated hybrid firms, which had significantly changed their external 
                                                   
1
 At academic conferences, researchers’ interest in the problem that pressure from the stock market 
could shorten the time horizon considered by corporate managers peaked around 1990 (Stein, 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Porter, 1990, 1992). Research on such myopic behavior subsequently 
became less active but has regained attention in recent years. This resurgence reflects shifting 
interest in this issue in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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governance systems, from traditional Japanese firms that retained their old institutional 
characteristics (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007).
2
 What impact did the reforms under Abenomics 
have on this evolution of corporate governance?  
     If the corporate governance reforms promoted changes in corporate governance systems, 
to what extent did they change Japanese corporate behavior? According to “Japan 
Revitalization Strategy 2014,” which extensively summarizes the plans under Abenomics, the 
government intended to change the mindset of corporate management by strengthening 
corporate governance and to enhance mechanisms for supporting aggressive business decisions 
for winning in global competition. Furthermore, the government expected firms earning high 
profits to actively utilize them for capital investment, bold business reorganizations, and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), instead of accumulating retained earnings.
3
 Did the 
corporate governance reforms, which was supported by two pillars―the JSC and the 
CGC―contribute as expected to enhance capital efficiency and corporate risk-taking? 
This paper aims to provide answers to these questions. To this end, we first examine the 
effects of introducing the JSC, one of the two pillars of corporate governance reforms. The 
direct effects of introducing the JSC include greater engagement by asset owners such as the 
Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), strengthened systems for engagement of 
traditional institutional investors (e.g., trust banks and investment advisory firms), a gradual 
shift of life insurance companies from being “silent” partners to becoming vocal long-term 
shareholders, and revitalization of the activity of activist funds. This paper also shows that the 
institutional investor ownership ratio increased during the reform period (2013–2017), that the 
increase was relatively large for firms with a small market capitalization and a low institutional 
investor ownership ratio, and therefore that the variation in ownership structure among firms 
decreased contrasting to the fact that it had rapidly increased after the banking crisis. 
Second, this paper examines changes in boards of directors brought about by the Japanese 
CGC and the amended Companies Act and analyzes the effects of the changes. Before 2014, it 
was left to firms to decide whether to appoint outside directors, and only about half of the 
publicly traded firms had at least one outside directors. However, the number of outside 
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 For details, see Aoki et al. (2007), Miyajima (2017), Miyajima et al. (2018). 
3
 “Japan Revitalization Strategy (Revised) 2014: Challenges toward the Future,” p. 5. 
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directors increased, although not continuously, after the implementation of the CGC. This 
paper summarizes changes in corporate boards brought about by corporate governance reforms, 
quantitatively analyzes the effects of these changes on corporate behavior and performance, 
and discusses the results. This paper insists that appointing outside directors does not 
necessarily have a general effect but does have a disciplinary effect on management at 
family-run firms, medium-sized firms, and firms with a low institutional investor ownership 
ratio. 
Third, the CGC was aimed at reducing relational shareholdings by requiring firms to 
explain the purpose of such shareholding. It is well known that cross-shareholding among 
firms had drastically diminished as a result of the dissolution of mutual shareholding 
relationships between firms and banks after the banking crisis, but the practice has steadily 
persisted, mainly in the form of cross-shareholding among industrial corporations (jigyo hojin) 
(Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007; Miyajima and Nitta, 2011). The Abe administration intended to 
put an end to this type of relational shareholding, considering that it decreased capital 
efficiency and blocked pressure on corporate management from capital markets. In this context, 
Jidinger and Miyajima (2019) focused on a sample of 200 firms with a high relational 
shareholding ratio, which are often called “bedrock companies (ganban kigyo),” and analyzed 
their shareholding behavior around the time of the corporate governance reforms. This paper 
discusses the result of the analysis and shows that even firms with a high relational 
shareholding ratio and those whose relational shareholding is mainly in the form of 
cross-shareholding have gradually sold their relational shareholdings. 
Abenomics was aimed at changing firms’ conservative business practices and increasing 
their earning power. In a final analysis, this paper examines how much corporate governance 
reforms affected corporate behavior, focusing on performance (ROE, ROA, operating profit 
margin), investment (capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, M&A), policy on shareholder 
returns (dividends and stock buybacks), debt selection (capital structure), and cash and 
equivalents held. 
Corporate performance increased starting in 2013, when Abenomics was implemented, so 
it is supposed that the corporate governance reforms contributed to some extent to firms’ 
improved performance by promoting disciplined management. However, these effects of the 
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reforms were based not on institutional investors’ increased influence, but on an increasing 
institutional investor ownership ratio, and also the size of the effect was small compared with 
the change in profit margins during the same period. In addition, no results indicate that 
corporate governance reforms had an effect on “real” investment, such as capital investment, 
M&A expenditure, and R&D expenditure. The association between the institutional investor 
ownership ratio and real investment had been consistently positive since 2000, but its 
magnitude was smaller during the reform period. There is no evidence that the association 
between the institutional investor ownership ratio and M&A or R&D expenditures did not 
significantly increase after the reforms. Therefore, the corporate governance reforms seem to 
have stopped short of changing corporate managers' attitudes toward risk and investment. 
The corporate governance reforms, however, clearly increased shareholder returns. The 
association between the institutional investor ownership ratio and the ratio of gross shareholder 
returns (dividend + repurchase) to shareholders' equity was consistently significant and 
positive, and the magnitude of the association was much higher (by about 60 percent) in the 
reform period. The use of increased profits du ring the Abenomics period was not limited to 
deliver to shareholders. Firms also continued to reduce debt started before the implementation 
of Abenomics and did not significantly changed following the corporate governance reforms. 
Increased shareholder returns and debt reduction did not deplete firms' profits, which resulted 
in the accumulation of cash and equivalents. The association between the institutional investor 
ownership ratio and the amount of cash and equivalents held was positive in the 
pre-Abenomics period. During the reform period, this association remained positive and the 
institutional investor ownership ratio increased by about 1.7 percent. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the characteristics of 
corporate governance reforms under Abenomics. Section 3 analyzes the effects of introducing 
the JSC, and Section 4 analyzes the effects of introducing the CGC on the appointment of 
outside directors. The effects of the reforms on relational shareholding are examined in Section 
5, and the extent to which the reforms affected corporate behavior is examined in Section 6. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Corporate Governance Reforms as a Growth Strategy 
Following the first boom of corporate governance reforms in the early 2000s, progress toward 
reforms began again” when the Second Abe Cabinet was formed at the end of 2012, replacing 
the Democratic Party of Japan Cabinet. Since then, corporate governance reforms have been 
pursued as a growth strategy—the third arrow of Abenomics—and a series of related policies 
have been implemented.  
As part of the Japan Revitalization Strategy of June 2013, the Cabinet announced its aim to 
promote corporate governance reforms by strengthening the fiduciary duties of institutional 
investors through the JSC, which was implemented in February 2014. The revised Japan 
Revitalization Strategy of June 2014 proposed strengthening Japanese corporate governance 
with a view to “revive the earning power of Japanese firms.”  Consequently, reforms were 
rapidly implemented in 2015, with the drafting and enactment of the CGC. That same year, the 
revised Companies Act came into force. In the revision of the Japan Revitalization Strategy of 
June 2016, top priority was given to the implementation of effective governance premised on 
structural reforms.
4
 A brief chronology of these developments is summarized in Table 1.  
 
-- Table 1 about here-- 
 
The aim of corporate governance reform package is clearly described in Japan 
Revitalization Strategy 2014:  
 
It is important to change the mindset of management by strengthening corporate 
governance and to establish a system in which active management is promoted by 
introducing the global level of return on equity (ROE) as a performance criterion. In 
particular, companies that achieve high accounting performance are expected to actively 
utilize their profit for further investment, active business restructuring, and M&A, instead 
of accumulating retained earnings.  
                                                   
4
 The specific reforms included 1) strengthening of a “pro-active” governance system; 2) 
promotion of constructive dialogue between firms and investors; and 3) further encouragement of 
measures to strengthen the management-supporting function of financial institutions, etc.  
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In this strategy, it was assumed that the conservative behavior of management could be 
changed by setting ROE as a performance criterion, enhancing shareholder engagement, 
appointing independent directors, and refining compensation systems. The characteristics of 
the corporate governance reforms under Abenomics can be summarized as follows.  
First, the corporate governance reforms in Japan clearly attempted to rebalance the 
influence among various corporate stakeholders by strengthening shareholder rights, implicitly 
acknowledging that the balance had been biased in favor of employees (insiders). Linking 
corporate governance reforms to corporate growth is a global trend (Kay, 2012; OECD, 2012), 
but the problems differ by country. In the United States and the United Kingdom, excessive 
risk-taking induced by performance-related compensation and myopic management due to 
strong pressure from shareholders are the targets of reform efforts.  
  Second, to solve various problems in corporate governance, the reforms promoted 
shareholder engagement, appointment of independent outside directors, and adoption of a 
performance-related compensation system. In general, strengthening shareholders' rights can 
lead to a higher likelihood of increasing dividends and shareholder returns at the cost of 
long-term investment, while closer monitoring of corporate management by shareholders can 
make managers less likely to take initiatives and enhancing performance-related compensation 
system can induce corporate managers to manipulate stock prices for their personal gain. 
However, the adoption of the reforms implies that the benefits of strengthening corporate 
governance were considered to exceed their costs. 
Third, it is important to note that strengthening corporate governance was expected to lead 
to corporate growth and increased productivity, as part of a mechanism for equally distributing 
the benefits of increased earnings to the public. Since corporate governance reforms directly 
increased the proportion of profits allocated to shareholders and corporate managers, wages 
and incomes would not rise without an increase in the added-value. The key to “equitably 
distributing the benefits of the reforms to the public” is that corporate growth spurred by 
increased investment must lead to increased productivity and higher value-added of labor, 
which must then leader to higher wages and income. A “trickle-down” mechanism was 
therefore assumed for the distribution of gains to employees. 
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Finally, it was agreed to adopt a framework for promoting reforms based not on 
mandatory regulations requiring firms to adhere to certain types of arrangements but on 
proposed best practices and the introduction of a “comply or explain” principle. The 
introduction of mandatory regulations pertaining to corporate governance would have the 
advantage of compelling the adoption of reforms by firms that need them, but this could 
possibly have many side effects for firms that do not need such reforms. So, one could argue 
that an approach that guarantees flexibility for firms while encouraging reforms is superior. 
This approach also provided a way to resolve the prolonged debate—that has persisted since 
2000—between the administrative authorities who favored mandatory regulations and the 
business community who opposed to them. 
 
 
3. Stewardship Code: Strengthening Engagement 
3.1 Enforcing Voting Standards, Active Involvement of Asset Owners and Insurance 
Companies  
The JSC was published in February 2014 and was modeled on the UK Stewardship Code of 
2010. The JSC has seven principles, including that institutional investors (1) have a clear 
policy on voting rights, (2) have a clear policy on managing conflicts of interest, (3) publicly 
disclose their voting activity, the results of voting activity, and other aspects of fulfilling their 
stewardship responsibilities. Immediately after the release of the JSC, 127 institutions agreed 
to comply with it, including the GPIF, the world’s largest public pension fund, with the total 
reaching 214 institutions in 2017.
5
 The implementation of the JSC has led to the following 
significant changes.  
First, asset owners such as pension funds are involved in the engagement process. In 
Japan, asset owners were less active as there were no active pension funds equivalent to 
CalPERS (Jacoby, 2007). The JSC required Japanese asset owners to actively monitor financial 
institutions entrusted with asset management. That most asset owners, particularly the GPIF, 
agreed to the JSC was an epoch-making change. The GPIF, which does not manage its assets 
in-house, does not disclose its own voting policies in detail, but it does ask financial 
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 Based on materials from the Financial Services Agency. 
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institutions entrusted with asset management to comply with the JSC and strictly implement 
stewardship activities. As a result, to get business from the GPIF, it is basically imperative for 
institutional investors to strictly follow the JSC. Furthermore, in 2017, the GPIF announced its 
“Voting Principles,” which require financial institutions to disclose their voting results for 
individual proposals in line with the new disclosure policy from the Financial Services 
Agencies.  
The second change was that implementation of the JSC led to institutional investors 
setting up independent voting divisions as well as strengthening voting standards. On the 
organizational side, for example, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust Bank established a committee for 
exercising voting rights within the asset management department. This committee discussed 
the basic policy on the exercise of voting rights and the policy for voting on individual 
resolutions, and these were then finalized by the managing director. In addition, to verify the 
monitoring results, a stewardship committee was organized, with the majority being outside 
third-party members.
6
 
The main standards for the exercise of voting rights, which were strengthened after the 
implementation of the JSC, are as follows: (1) profitability standards for appointment of 
directors, (2) governance standards, and (3) standards for payout policies (see Table 2). 
Regarding item (1), an advisory organization for exercising the voting right, Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), announced a new recommendation, which explicitly set capital 
productivity (ROE) as a proposed standard for the appointment of directors in October 2014, 
and suggested voting against the top management at companies with a return on equity (ROE) 
below 5% over the past five consecutive years. A Japanese investment advisory company 
introduced similar standards. 
Regarding item (2) on governance arrangements, most institutions set the standard for 
appointing multiple outside directors. ISS recommended, for example, voting against 
appointment of a top executive “if the board after the shareholder meeting does not include at 
least one outsider, regardless of independence.”. Regarding item (3) on payout policy, Daiwa 
SB Investment Ltd. set the following standard, “for companies with excessive cash, over 50% 
                                                   
6
 Mitsubishi UFJ Trust “Exercise of stock voting rights in the property trust operation” 
（http://www.tr.mufg.jp/houjin/jutaku/pdf/unyou_kabu_1_pdf.pdf） 
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of the total profit will be expected to be paid as dividend.” In addition, the standards for 
compensation policy were also clarified. Both foreign and domestic institutional investors 
indicated their approval for a performance-related compensation system, while opposing 
retirement benefits such as the so-called one-yen option. Anti-takeover defenses were clearly 
opposed. Consequently, it is estimated that once the percentage shares held by institutional 
investors exceeds 62% on average, introducing anti-takeover defenses would be impossible.
7
 
 
--Table 2 about here – 
 
Third, an important outcome of the JSC is to transform insurance companies from “silent” 
partners to “long-term shareholders with a voice.”8 The shareholding of insurance companies 
declined from 14% in 1995, to 11% in 2004, and to 5.7% in 2014. Also, insurance companies 
are investing in fewer firms, with a decrease for Nippon Life from 1412 in 2000 to 1014 in 
2014, and a decrease for Dai-ichi Life Insurance from 1054 to 501.
9
 Insurance companies 
reduced their stockholdings evenly at the early phase of the reduction and then took made 
selective reductions after the mid-2000s. Agreeing to the JSC means that they first disclosed 
the results of their voting activity. In 2017, Dai-ichi decided to separately disclose their voting 
results for individual firms. While the ratio of votes against companies’ proposals was low, life 
insurance companies emphasized long-term dialogue with the companies in which they 
invested, rather than the exercise of their voting right.
10
 According to our interview from a 
leading insurance company, it engages in dialogue with the core companies (200-300 
                                                   
7
 Opposition rate (Y) against takeover defense measures at general shareholders meetings in June 
2015 was Y＝90.468+0.6514X, whereas X is the ratio of stock ownership of institutional investors 
(estimation by Nomura Securities). 
8
 Focusing on this point, insurance companies were assumed and counted as insiders for the issuing 
company both in our research as well as in other studies (Franks et al., 2014; Miyajima and Ogawa, 
2016). 
9
 Miyajima and Suzuki (2018). We counted the number of firms for which the insurance company 
was listed in the top 30 shareholders. 
10
 The average rate of voting against proposals is 5% for insurance companies compared with 20% 
for trust banks and asset management firms (based on materials from the Financial Services 
Agency). 
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companies) that it has invested in and examines their responses using several criteria.
11
 
The final change associated with the JSC is that various types of institutions participate in 
the engagement process. In addition to proxy advisory agencies such as ISS and Glass Lewis, 
Governance for Owners and Hermes Equity Ownership Services act as stewardship agents in 
dialogue on behalf of fund managers. In addition, focus funds such as Taiho Pacific Partners 
and Asuka Asset Management Co., Ltd. agreed to the JSC. They invest in a small number of 
stocks, while engaging in dialogue with the companies on the premise of long-term 
shareholding. On the other hand, with the support of METI, organizations such as the Investors 
Management Forum (June 2015) and the Forums of Investors Japan (July 2015) were formed 
to serve as contact organizations for institutional investors. Thus, in addition to the traditional 
institutional investors, an interactive engagement system was gradually formed. 
 
Improving the Attractiveness of the Japanese Market  
Corporate governance reforms under Abenomics were expected to improve the 
attractiveness of the Japanese market through the JSC coupled with reorganization of corporate 
boards following the implementation of the CGC, which is discussed below. Theoretically 
speaking, the reforms were expected to mitigate the information asymmetry between foreign 
institutional investors and publicly traded firms in Japan. In particular, the JSC was expected to 
increase the institutional investor ownership ratio and strengthen the influence of institutional 
investors. Let us next examine the extent to which firms' ownership structure changed due to 
the corporate governance reforms under Abenomics. Table 3 focuses on firms listed on the 
First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (hereinafter, TSE-1 firms) and shows the 
institutional investor ownership ratio and the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio. 
 
--Table 3 about here-- 
 
First, it should be noted that the institutional investor ownership ratio (simple average) 
significantly increased from 19.8 percent in 2012 to 27.8 percent in 2017. The latter percentage 
exceeds the highest percentage observed before the global financial crisis (approximately 23 
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 Questionnaire survey, June 2017. 
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percent in 2005 and 2006) by almost 5 percentage points. Of the increase of about 8 percentage 
points between 2012 and 2017, increased shareholding by foreign institutional investors 
accounts for 4.7 percentage points, and increased shareholding by domestic institutional 
investors accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The increased shareholding by domestic 
institutional investors was due to the increase in stockholding of the GPIF that started in 2015 
and due to ETF purchases by the Bank of Japan. These entities commission trust banks and 
investment advisory firms to purchase shares.  
The shares held by these financial institutions in this manner, combined with the other 
shares they hold, affect their choice of firms for engagement, and the firms issuing these shares 
become subject to the exercise of voting rights by these financial institutions that follow their 
voting guidelines. Experts have pointed out that the increased stockholding of the GPIF and the 
ETF purchases by the Bank of Japan entail problems related to stock pricing and restricted 
choice in selling shares. However, from the standpoint of corporate governance, these activities 
clearly strengthen investor engagement. The increase in shareholding by foreign institutional 
investors can be attributed to heightened trust in the Japanese market resulting from progress 
made in reform efforts, while the increase (including the dramatic increase in FY 2012) also 
seems to be attributable to the lower price of Japanese stocks caused by depreciation of the 
yen. 
A second point to note is a decrease in the variation among firms in the institutional 
investor ownership ratio, particularly, the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio. This 
stands in contrast to the fact that the variation across different firm sizes increased from 1997 
to 2005 (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007). The behavior of foreign institutional investors is 
strongly biased as they tend to prefer larger firms, liquidity, and familiarity. As Table 3 shows, 
the average institutional investor ownership ratio and the average foreign institutional investor 
ownership ratio were 37.2 percent and 25.2 percent, respectively, for the firms in the fifth 
quintile of market capitalization as of the end of FY 2012. In contrast, the averages are 18.2 
percent and 10.5 percent, respectively, for the firms in the third quintile and 6.5 percent and 3.2 
percent for the firms in the first quintile. A similar trend was widely observed in the United 
States and other countries in the 1990s (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). However, as progress 
was made in corporate governance reforms in Japan, the investment activity of foreign 
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institutional investors expanded to include small- and mid-cap stocks. Table 3 shows that 
increases in the institutional investor ownership ratio (foreign institutional investor ownership 
ratio) are large among the firms in the second and third quintiles of market capitalization, at 8.6 
percent (5.0 percent) and 9.7 percent (6.5 percent), respectively, which are above the overall 
average of 8.0 percent (4.7 percent). The coefficient of variation (standard deviation / mean) 
for the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio decreased by about 20 percent, from 0.912 
in 2012 to 0.711 in 2017. 
As for differences in ownership structure across different firm sizes are large, it is clear that 
the firms included in the MSCI Japan Index or the JPX-Nikkei 400 (JPX400) index equally 
face pressure from institutional investors while small and medium-sized firms are subject to 
less pressure from institutional investors. Corporate governance reforms, however, began to 
lessen this difference, and small and medium-sized firms that had received little pressure from 
institutional investors have been increasingly subject to the engagement of these shareholders. 
 
 
4. Corporate Governance Code: Board Reforms 
4.1 Major Aims of the Corporate Governance Code  
The second pillar of corporate governance reforms under Abenomics was the Japanese 
CGC, which was modeled on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Intensive 
discussion and drafting on the CGC was started in late 2014 and it was soon adopted in June 
2015, reflecting the serious efforts of the Abe Cabinet to move forward on this issue. The CGC 
comprises 5 general principles, 30 principles, and 38 supplementary principles (a total of 73 
items). The 5 general principles are (1) protection of shareholder rights, (2) cooperation with 
stakeholders, (3) information disclosure and transparency, (4) responsibilities of the board of 
directors, and (5) dialogue with shareholders
12
.  
The CGC includes various items on best practices, ranging from early mailing of 
proposals to shareholders and sufficient explanation of important capital policies (seasoned 
equity offerings and management buyouts) to takeover defenses. We focus on the effects of the 
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 The English text is available at 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/20180602_en.pdf]] 
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CGC on board design and cross-shareholding, considering that these would have the most 
significant impact on the essential characteristics of corporate governance among Japanese 
firms. 
 
4.2 Appointing Independent Outside Directors and Reorganizing Corporate 
Boards 
Regarding the impact of the CGC, we first examine the extent to which the CGC has 
changed board structures among Japanese companies. Three points should be noted.  
First, Principle 4 of the CGC requires firms to appoint at least two independent directors. 
If this requirement is not satisfied, then they must provide a sufficient reason for not adopting 
this practice.  
Second, the revised Companies Act made it possible for listed firms to choose the new 
option of becoming a company with audit and supervisory committee (kansa tou iinkai secchi 
gaisha), in addition to the conventional system of a company with company auditor 
(kansa-yaku  kai secchi gaisha) and a company with nominating committee, etc (CWNC; 
shimei iinkai tou secchi gaisha). The aim of this revision of the law is to encourage a shift from 
the current management boards to monitoring boards for firms, considering that firms felt it 
was difficult to choose a U.S.-type system of CWNC, where half of the directors must be 
independent. On the other hand, a hidden motivation of the revision is to allow former outside 
auditors to become new outsider directors, given the serious shortage of independent directors. 
Moreover, the CGC recommended establishing informal committees such as a nomination 
committee and a compensation committee. 
Third, Principle 4-10 of the CGC states that when a publicly traded firm adopts the most 
appropriate organizational design for its characteristics based on specifications in the 
Companies Act, it should try to further improve its governance systems by utilizing optional 
mechanisms as needed. The CGC also states that firms should set up, under the board of 
directors, independent advisory committees, such as nomination and compensation committees, 
whose main members are independent outside directors. In this way, firms should receive 
appropriate advice and engagement from independent outside directors in examining 
particularly important issues such as those related to nominations and compensation. 
15 
 
 Though outside directors had previously been appointed at a slow pace, the measures 
described above promoted unprecedented appointment of outside directors. As seen in Table 4, 
Panel A, the average number of outside directors drastically increased from 1.17 in 2012 
(before introduction of the CGC) to 2.42 in 2015 (after introduction of the CGC). The 
proportion of outside directors on corporate boards also jumped from 13.7 percent to 28.3 
percent. As Figure 1 shows, the average number of outside directors gradually increased since 
2004, but it took 10 years to exceed 1. The number suddenly rose due to these measures. By 
2017, the percentage of firms with at least two outside directors reached 93.4 percent, which 
shows that most firms complied with the CGC instead of providing explanations for 
non-compliance. 
 
--Table 4 /Figure 1 about here-- 
 
The JPX400 is an index of major firms that have been primary investment targets of 
overseas institutional investors. The proportion of JPX400 firms with no outside director had 
already declined to 24 percent by the end of FY 2012. Many of the firms in this group had 
voluntarily appointed outside directors before the introduction of the CGC because of the 
strong demand from institutional investors. From a different angle, however, this means that 
more than 20 percent of these firms maintained an all-insider board of directors at their own 
discretion, despite pressure from institutional investors. Therefore, another significance of the 
CGC is that firms that had avoided voluntarily appointing outside directors implemented major 
reforms around the time of the CGC’s introduction. 
The case of the Toyota Motor Corporation is a representative example. During the first 
peak period of corporate governance reforms between 1998 to 2002, the firm intentionally did 
not appoint outside directors and had an explicit policy of having board members also serve as 
executive officers. The stated reason was that, in making important decisions, it was essential 
for the manufacturing firm's board members to have direct knowledge of its workplace, and the 
firm emphasized that it would address issues involving self-supervision by increasing the 
number of outside auditors (Inoue, 2004). However, as corporate governance reforms were 
rapidly advanced by the Abe Cabinet, the firm shifted its policy in March 2013 and appointed 
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outside directors for the first time. They were a former vice president of GM, a former 
chairman of Nippon Life Insurance, and a former bureaucrat. Similar examples were seen at 
companies such as Canon, FANUC, and Keyence, which were highly competitive in 
manufacturing. The corporate governance reforms therefore induced firms that had maintained 
a traditional management board to reorganize their boards of directors. 
As of 2018, the proportion of firms that became companies with an audit and supervisory 
committee (kansa iinkai secchi gaisha) due to the 2015 amendment to the Companies Act was 
24 percent, and about a quarter of TSE-1 firms became this type of company. In particular, a 
number of relatively small firms made the transition. More specifically, 27 percent of 
non-JPX400 firms made this change, whereas 15 percent of JPX400 firms did so. Even though 
the introduction of the CGC and other measures brought significant changes to Japanese firms' 
boards, few firms applied a U.S.-type system of CWNC (companies with nomination, audit, 
and compensation committees). The proportion of companies with these three committees rose 
by only 0.4 percentage points between 2013 and 2018. A reason is that firms are very wary of 
the possibility that outside directors in the nomination committee gain control over important 
personnel-related decisions. 
It should be also noted that a number of firms set up a nomination committee and a 
compensation committee, which were voluntary, when the CGC was introduced. By 2018, 
about 30 percent of the TSE-1 firms had a voluntary committee. More than half of JPX400 
firms have a voluntary committee. If the statutory nomination committee is also taken into 
account, about 60 percent of firms have a nomination committee. 
As discussed above, Japanese firms' boards of directors significantly changed when the 
CGC was introduced; however, these boards remain less independent than boards of the firms 
in other advanced countries such as the United States where the average proportion of 
independent outside directors on a board of directors is around 70 percent. Therefore, even if 
firms set up a voluntary committee when the Code was introduced, they did not fully transition 
from a management board system, in which the board is essentially characterized by its 
engagement in business management, to a monitoring board system in which the board 
specializes in supervising management activities. As boards of directors at many firms still 
function as a management board, the creation of voluntary committees at JPX400 firms with a 
17 
 
high institutional investor ownership ratio could be interpreted as the fine-tuning of their 
internal governance systems to adapt to an external change. 
 
4.3 Effects of Board Reforms  
Appointing Outside Directors  
Did the increase in the number of outside directors following the implementation of the 
CGC and other policies lead to better management results? The reforms were implemented 
based on the assumption that there were firms with few outside directors (i.e., firms that should 
appoint them but had not done so), that the introduction of the CGC would induce such firms 
to appoint outside directors, and that management policies would subsequently change to 
improve corporate performance. Fauver et al. (2017) analyzed the effect of board-related 
reforms in 41 countries and reported that the reforms led to an increase in corporate value, 
especially in countries that adopted a comply-or-explain rule. 
Another scenario can be envisioned, however. Indeed, many Japanese firms voluntarily 
appointed outside directors suitable for them, meaning that many firms needing to appoint 
outside directors had already done so. It is therefore possible that the introduction of the CGC 
has given firms with no need for outside directors no choice but to appoint them. It is also 
possible that such firms appoint outside directors as a formality, just to comply with the CGC, 
and do not take advantage of their presence on the board. In both cases, appointing outside 
directors would not affect management policies or corporate performance. Duchin et al. (2010) 
show that on average the increase in the number of outside directors intended to comply with 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and listing regulations did not lead to an increase in corporate value or 
profit. 
To examine the validity of the two scenarios, this paper takes advantage of introduction of 
the CGC and estimates the causal effect of an increased number of outside directors on 
corporate performance and corporate behavior. It is difficult to accurately ascertain the effects 
of a corporate governance system on corporate performance due to the reverse causality (i.e., 
corporate governance affects corporate behavior and performance, while corporate 
performance affects governance). Furthermore, there is the problem of endogeneity as it is 
impossible to control for all factors that influence both performance and governance. We use 
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difference-in-difference method for overcoming this problem. We assume that the appointment 
of outside directors following the introduction of the CGC was intended to comply with 
Principle 4-8, which stipulates that a firm should appoint at least two independent outside 
directors. In other words, the increase in the number of outside directors was caused not by 
changes in corporate attributes or other factors, but by an exogenous measure (i.e., a policy). 
Therefore, estimation of the causal effect of the appointment of outside directors is considered 
possible by comparing changes in the corporate performance and behavior of firms that did not 
fulfill the CGC’s principle prior to its implementation but subsequently appointed outside 
directors, with changes in the corporate performance of firms that already fulfilled the principle 
even before the CGC’s implementation. 
Based on the idea described above, we analyze a sample of TSE-1 firms in 2013. 
Specifically, in the analysis the dependent variable is change in corporate performance before 
and after the introduction of the CGC and the explanatory variables include change in the 
number of outside directors. To deal with the endogeneity of change in the number of outside 
directors, a dummy variable is used as instrumental variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
number of outside directors was less than two before the introduction of the Code and zero 
otherwise. Approximately 60 percent of firms had less than two outside directors before the 
introduction of the Code, meaning that they did not fulfill Principle 4-8. About 80 percent of 
these firms had appointed two or more outside directors as of one period after the introduction 
of the Code and fulfilled this principle. In fact, at the first stage of analysis, in which the 
dependent variable is change in the number of outside directors, the coefficient of the dummy 
variable is approximately 1 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
--Table 5 about here -- 
 
Table 5 shows the results of estimating the effects of change in the number of outside 
directors on corporate performance, taking endogeneity into account (i.e., the results of the 
second stage). The results do not show that an increase in the number of outside directors led to 
a statistically significant improvement in performance as measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin's 
q. These results seem to suggest that the second scenario is valid. It is possible, however, that 
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the effectiveness of outside directors varies depending on corporate attributes. Therefore, 
analysis is performed including interaction terms (Change in number of outside directors × 
Firm size (sales); Change in number of outside directors × Foreign ownership ratio; Change 
in number of outside directors × Managerial ownership ratio). The coefficient of the 
interaction term (Change in number of outside directors × Foreign ownership ratio) is 
negative and significant in some estimation models. This result implies that a greater 
performance improvement follows an increase in the number of outside directors for a firm that 
has a lower foreign ownership ratio and faces less discipline from capital markets. For example, 
a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign ownership ratio is associated with a 0.6 
percentage point increase in ROA if the number of outside directors increases by two. The 
coefficient of the interaction term (Change in number of outside directors × Managerial 
ownership ratio) is positive and significant in some estimation models. More specifically, a 
10-percentage point increase in the management ownership ratio is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point increase in ROA if the number of outside directors increases by two. This 
result implies that greater performance improvement follows an increase in the number of 
outside directors for a family-run firm where the founding family has strong managerial 
control. 
As for the increased risk-taking anticipated under Abenomics, on average there is no 
evidence of an increase in the number of outside directors leading to an increase in capital 
investment or R&D expenditure even when corporate attributes are taken into account. 
 
Companies with an Audit and Supervisory Committee and Voluntary Committees  
As discussed above, corporate governance reforms provided an opportunity for appointing 
outside directors and reorganizing the board of directors. The revision of the Companies Act, 
which coincided with the implementation of the CGC created a new option (company with an 
audit and supervisory committee), in addition to the existing options (company with an auditor 
board (traditional) and company with nomination, audit, and compensation committees [U.S. 
style]). Also, supplemental principles recommended firms to create voluntary committees such 
as a nomination committee and a compensation committee. 
Approximately a quarter of TSE-1 firms consequently became companies with an audit 
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and supervisory committee; however, the results of our analysis do not show that the transition 
had any obvious effect on corporate behavior or performance. This implies that firms decided 
to become companies with an audit and supervisory committee to not only improve their 
corporate governance, but also fulfill a principle of the CGC. 
In contrast, the existence of voluntary committees has a substantial impact on corporate 
governance. According to our estimation, given a 5 percent increase in ROA, executive 
compensation at a firm with a voluntary compensation committee is 9 percent higher than that 
at a firm without a compensation committee. This result implies that creation of a 
compensation committee may lead to a higher proportion of performance-based pay in 
executive compensation. Also, a firm with a nomination committee is more responsive to 
corporate performance in terms of changes in management. More specifically, if ROA falls 
from its average by 5 percent, the probability of the top executive being replaced at a firm with 
a nomination committee is 1.3 percent higher than that at a firm without a nomination 
committee. Voluntary committees not only perform their responsibilities, but also potentially 
affect corporate behavior and performance through improved quality of decisions made by the 
board of directors and through increased incentives for corporate managers. The result of the 
relevant estimation shows that creation of a voluntary committee at a firm has a statistically 
significant effect on its financial policy while it is not sufficiently clear whether creation of a 
voluntary committee leads to improved corporate performance. The results also show that 
compared with the situation before creating a voluntary committee, a firm with a voluntary 
committee has a higher level of shareholder returns (including stock buybacks) and a lower 
level of cash and equivalents held. 
 
 
5. Corporate Governance Reforms and Reduction of Relational Shareholdings  
5.1 Promoting Sales of Relational Shareholdings  
Principle 1-4 of the CGC demands that firms explain the reason for relational 
shareholding, as seen in the follows. 
 
Firms should disclose their policy on relational shareholding. Also, each year, the board of 
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directors should examine the medium- to long-term economic rationale behind relational 
shareholding and its future prospects from the standpoint of return and risk and provide a 
concrete explanation on the purpose and rationality of relational shareholding. Publicly traded 
firms should set and disclose their standards that are used to guarantee proper exercise of voting 
rights granted due to relational shareholding. 
 
In June 2015, immediately after the introduction of the CGC, Mizuho Bank announced a 
further reduction of cross-shareholdings. In the same month, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking and 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ also announced their intention to reduce cross-shareholdings. It 
is true, however, that the amount of stocks held by banks fell to about 3 percent of stocks held 
by TSE-1 firms as a result of the rapid decline of cross-shareholding with industrial 
corporations that started in 2000 (see Figure 2), and three mega banks held stocks worth about 
9 trillion yen. In addition, while the three mega banks explicitly showed their intention to 
reduce the amount of their cross-shareholdings, they had an internal conflict: the finance 
department wanted to avoid the price volatility of shares, but the loan department was hesitant 
about selling them as it wanted to maintain good business relationships with borrowers. 
 
--Figure 2 about here-- 
 
Relational shareholding consequently started to be mainly conducted between industrial 
corporations. As the risk of holding stocks increased due to the introduction of mark-to-market 
accounting, firms that had intensified this type of relational shareholding in the name of 
strategic cooperation in 2006 to 2008 had to book large impairment losses after the global 
financial crisis. Also, as institutional investors increasingly demanded efficient use of capital, 
firms needed to review their relational shareholding. The introduction of the CGC is 
considered to have provided an opportunity for firms to reexamine whether they should 
continue their relational shareholding or sell stocks held for relational purposes.
13
 
The market positively reacted to firms' reduction of relational shareholding. For example, 
Yamaha announced after the end of the trading session on November 28, 2017 that it would 
                                                   
13
 In FY 2015, the real value of such sales was around 1.6 trillion yen for the TSE as a whole, and 
1,024 firms (47 percent of the listed firms) were considered to have reduced relational 
shareholdings (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “One-Trillion-Yen Discontinuation of Cross-Shareholding,” 
August 18, 2016). 
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sell 8 million cross-held shares of Yamaha Motor and, at the same time, decided to use the 
proceeds from the sale to buyback 3.7 percent (7 million shares) of Yamaha's outstanding 
shares, with a spending limit of 25 billion yen. The stock price of Yamaha rose by 7 percent 
next day as the market positively viewed the firm's improved ROE and shareholder returns.
14
  
 
5.2 Relational Shareholding in Reality 
Table 6 compares firms in the top quartile of the relational shareholding ratio with those 
in the bottom quartile, as well as firms in the top quartile of the cross-shareholding ratio with 
those in the bottom quartile. Firms in the top quartile of both measures on average have lower 
profitability and lower growth opportunities, smaller market capitalization, lower CAPEX, 
R&D, and M&A expenditures, and a lower percentage of foreign ownership. 
  
--Table 6 about here-- 
 
This inverse correlation between high relational/cross-shareholding and corporate 
performance that the Abe Cabinet and other policymakers have paid considerable attention.
15
 
Because of reverse causality, the exact causal relationship between high 
relational/cross-shareholding and low profitability and low growth opportunities is not clear. 
The decision to sell relational shareholdings is voluntary, so firms with low profitability and 
low growth opportunities are likely to keep their relational/cross-shareholdings due to their 
intention to maintain a close relationship with other firms or due to their lack of institutional 
investors. This is exactly what happened during the 1997-2004 period, when banks rapidly 
reduced their cross-shareholding (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007).  
However, once ownership structures stabilized after 2006, it is highly plausible that high 
relational shareholding caused low performance (low ROA, low stock returns, and less active 
investment. Miyajima and Nitta (2011), Miyajima and Hoda (2015), and Miyajima and Ogawa 
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 “Yamaha up 7%: Positive Response to Buyback and End of Cross-Shareholding Relationship” 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 29, 2017). 
15
 It used to be assumed that cross-shareholding played a positive role in Japanese economic 
growth. See Aoki (1990), Abeglen and Stark (1985), Flath (1993), and Odagiri (1992).  
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(2016) reported that high foreign or institutional ownership caused low performance, while 
Ikeda et al. (2018) found that firms with high cross-shareholding were likely to have had low 
performance due to enjoying the so-called “quiet life.” 
 
5.3 Reduction of Relational Shareholdings Due to Corporate Governance Reforms  
The JSC states that institutional investors should become actively engaged in managerial 
decisions of firms in which they hold stocks. Promoting efficient use of capital is one of the 
main activities in such investor engagement. One of the demands to firms made by recently 
reinvigorated activist funds was also effective use of capital, including reexamination of 
relational shareholdings and increased shareholder returns through sale of relational 
shareholdings. 
The CGC as revised in 2015 states that firms should provide reasons for relational 
shareholding and explain their validity. After the introduction of the CGC, all publicly traded 
firms explained their reasons for relational shareholding in their corporate governance reports, 
following Principle 1-4. However, their explanations lack variety as they are quite similar to 
one another. It should be noted, however, that in response to the CGC’s principle that firms 
should examine the rationality of relational shareholding, the boards of some firms started to 
regularly consider relevant issues in decision-making. This implies that outside directors 
started to play a substantial role in making decisions on relational shareholdings. 
For capturing a firm’s decisions on relational shareholding, it is not appropriate to focus 
on the accounting information of relational shareholding based on its current value, as it is 
highly subject to the market fluctuations. Therefore, Jidinger and Miyajima (2019) use the actual 
number of shares of relational shareholding, which is available from the end of FY 2010, when 
amendment of information disclosure rules first required firms to disclose details of their 
relational shareholdings.
16
  
In Table 7, row A shows the aggregate number of firms that sold at least one named stock 
from their relational shareholdings. The percentage of firms that decided to sell increased 
considerably from 36% in 2012 before the CGC to 51% in 2015 and to 89% in 2017. Row B 
                                                   
16
 The amendment required all listed firms to disclose the following: the name of firms, the number 
of shares held, and the book and current values of those shares. 
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shows the aggregate number of named stocks in relational shareholdings for all 200 companies 
and those that were sold. A substantial increase in the decision to sell is also observed following 
the enactment of the CGC in 2015. From 2015 to 2017, the total number of decisions to sell 
increased from 330 in 2012, to 482 in 2015, and to 1073 in 2017. Thus, the probability of a 
relational shareholding asset being sold increased from 7% in 2012 to 21% in 2017.  
Lastly, row C shows the average number of firm decisions in the sample, which is the 
number of decisions to sell at time t standardized by the number of named stocks held at time t - 
1. It shows a discontinuous jump in 2015 from the previous level of 2.7 to 3.4 and reaches as high 
of 5.8 in 2017. The last row shows the total number of shares per firm, which declined from 26.9 
million to 21.2 million, roughly a 22% reduction, following the corporate governance reforms. 
 
--- Table 7 about here --- 
 
In light of these simple descriptive statistics, we posit that the CGC reforms have been 
effective not only for all listed companies but also implicitly for firms in the top quartile of 
relational-shareholding (the core of cross-shareholding companies). To better understand the 
effects, we first estimate the aggregate data that may affect a company’s decision to sell 
relational shareholding.  
 
5.4 Determinants  
Which stocks did “bedrock companies” sell? Jidinger and Miyajima (2019) focused on 
these firms, which have a high relational shareholding ratio, and analyzed their annual 
decisions on selling relational shareholdings by estimating (1) a fixed-effect model in which 
the dependent variable is the number of firms issuing stocks sold by the bedrock firm each year 
and (2) a logit model focusing on each individual shareholding relationship, in which the 
dependent variable indicates sale or continued shareholding for each year. 
First, the results of their analysis revealed the following tendencies: a bedrock firm with a 
higher ratio of relational shareholdings to total assets was more likely to sell; a bedrock firm 
having smaller latent gains from relational shareholdings was more likely to sell; stocks with 
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larger latent gains were sold before those with smaller latent gains; and a bedrock firm with a 
greater need to secure liquidity by selling shareholdings (i.e., a firm with a higher debt ratio or 
a lower interest coverage ratio) was more likely to sell. Put simply, the decision on whether to 
sell relational shareholdings was basically made in a financially rational manner. 
Second, the introduction of the CGC has a significant positive relationship with sale of 
shares both (1) in the analysis where the number of firms issuing the stocks sold by a bedrock 
firm is the dependent variable and (2) in the analysis of the decision on whether to sell a 
shareholding in a firm. For example, the estimation results for the first analysis shows that, all 
things being equal, the introduction of the CGC increased the number of firms issuing stocks 
sold by a bedrock firm from 2.5 to 3.4. 
Third, the second analysis made it possible to examine the cross-shareholding relationship 
between two firms and revealed that the existence of a cross-shareholding relationship formed 
the foundation of relational shareholding. The corporate governance reforms centered on the 
JSC and CGC induced firms to sell relational shareholdings in other firms despite the existence 
of cross-shareholding relationships with them. 
Lastly, a bedrock firm with a high foreign ownership ratio was less likely to sell relational 
shareholdings. This result contrasts with the tendency for TSE-1 firms with a higher 
institutional investor ownership ratio to have, on average, a lower relational shareholding ratio 
and a lower cross-shareholding ratio. The characteristic of bedrock firms that their relational 
shareholding ratio is high when the proportion of their shares held by institutional investors is 
high implies that one of the motivations for relational shareholding is to block pressure from 
capital markets. The corporate governance reforms have not been effective enough in 
mitigating this entrenchment effect. 
In sum, corporate governance reforms based on a comply-or-explain rule was effective in 
reducing bedrock firms’ relational shareholdings, which had hardly changed previously. 
 
 
6. Consequences of Corporate Governance Reforms under Abenomics 
6.1 Corporate Performance after Corporate Governance Reforms  
As discussed in the previous section, since the start of the Second Abe Cabinet in 2012, 
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cross-shareholding has declined, and the institutional investor ownership ratio has increased 
due to the introduction of the JSC and the CGC. Also, since 2014, dialogue between 
institutional investors and firms on long-term corporate management and financial policy has 
become increasingly active as standards regarding institutional investor voting were 
strengthened and as institutional investor engagement further increased. A question now arises 
as to whether these changes influenced firms' decision-making and gave rise to the economic 
virtuous circle envisioned by Abenomics. This section examines this question. 
Table 8 shows the performance of TSE-1 firms. From 2012, when the Abe Cabinet was 
formed, to 2017, mean ROE increased by 2.8 percentage points from 5.8 to 8.6 percent, and 
median ROE increased by 2.4 percentage points. Also, mean and median ROE in 2017 
exceeded values before the global financial crisis by 1.6 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. 
To examine what caused this increase, ROE was decomposed into net profit margin (net profit 
/ sales), total asset turnover (sales / total assets), and financial leverage (total assets / equity). 
Mean and median net profit margin increased by 1.9 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively, 
between 2012 and 2017, which contributed to the increase in ROE. A similar tendency is 
observed for the operating profit margin (note: operating profit is not affected by non-operating 
profit or loss, or by extraordinary profit or loss). In contrast, both mean and median total asset 
turnover fell by 0.04 between 2012 and 2017, which lessened the increase in ROE. Similarly, 
mean and median financial leverage decreased by 0.29 and 0.12, respectively, also lessening 
the increase in ROE. These results show that the increase in ROE between 2012 and 2017 is 
attributable to improved profitability, but not to increased asset efficiency or use of debt. 
 
--- Table 8 about here --- 
 
ROA exhibits a similar pattern: Over the period from 2012 to 2017, mean ROA increased 
by 1.1 percentage points from 6.4 to 7.5 percent, and median ROA increased by 1.3 percentage 
points. As mentioned above, total asset turnover decreased during the same period. Therefore, 
the increase in ROA is solely attributable to an increase in profit margins. 
  How were increased profits used? Contrary to what was anticipated under Abenomics, 
investment did not markedly increase. From 2012 to 2017, the mean of the ratio of capital 
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expenditure to physical fixed assets increased by only 1.2 percentage points from 16.0 to 17.2 
percent, and its median increased by only 0.8 percentage points. Over the same period, the 
mean R&D intensity (R&D expenditure / sales) decreased by 0.2 percentage points from 2.7 to 
2.5 percent, and its median also fell by 0.2 percentage points. While the mean of a measure of 
cash acquisitions of firms (total acquisition / total assets) increased by 0.1 percentage points 
from 0.3 to 0.4 percent, its median was zero. This shows that most firms do not engage in 
corporate acquisition, and some large acquisitions (cross-border M&A) seems to have driven 
mean values. 
Payout for shareholders showed a statistically significant increase during the Abenomics 
period. From 2012 to 2017, the mean ratio of total annual dividends to equity rose 0.5 
percentage points from 1.9 to 2.4 percent, and its median rose 0.4 percentage points. Also, the 
mean ratio of total annual dividends plus stock buybacks to equity increased 0.7 percentage 
points from 2.4 to 3.1 percent, and its median increased by 0.5 percentage points. The increase 
in this ratio accounts for about a quarter of the increase in ROE, which shows that a major part 
of the profit increase was used for dividends and stock buybacks. 
Not all the profit increase was used for dividends. Some of it was used to reduce debt, and 
the rest was held by firms as retained earnings. The mean cash and equivalents ratio ([cash and 
equivalents + securities] / [total assets - cash and equivalents - securities]) increased by 2.8 
percentage points from 27.2 to 31.1 percent, and its median increased by 3.0 percentage points. 
Taken together, these results show that after the start of the Abe administration in 2012, 
firms' earning creation increased due to depreciation of the yen, corporate tax cuts, and other 
factors, and ROE rose mainly because of firms' improved profitability. The increased profit led 
to increased shareholder returns, but not to increased investment. Therefore, the amount of 
cash held by firms increased in 2013 and continued to do so in subsequent years, contrary to 
what was anticipated under Abenomics. 
 
6.2 Effects of Corporate Governance Reforms  
How are the changes described above related to corporate governance reforms? The 
following simple model is estimated, taking into account the fact that the reforms sought to 
change corporate behavior by strengthening shareholders’ authority. 
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Pi,t =F ( INSTi,t, JSC,INST*JSC、Xi,t, Yt) 
 
Pi,t is a variable that measures corporate performance or behavior. ROE, ROA, and the 
operating profit margin are used as measures of corporate performance. The ratio of debt to 
total assets, the ratio of total annual dividends to equity, the ratio of total annual dividends plus 
stock buybacks to equity, the ratio of capital expenditure to physical fixed assets, R&D 
intensity, the ratio of acquisitions to total assets, and the cash and equivalents ratio are used as 
measures of corporate behavior. Xi,t denotes control variables that measure various corporate 
attributes such as firm size. Yt is a year dummy. INSTi,t denotes the institutional investor 
ownership ratio or the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio at the beginning of each 
year. JSC is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for 2014, when the JSC was implemented, 
and subsequent years. INST*JSC is an interaction term between the institutional investor 
ownership ratio and the JSC dummy. The main focus of this analysis is on this interaction term. 
If the JSC changed institutional investors' attitudes, a higher institutional investor ownership 
ratio (especially, the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio) would lead to a greater 
change in corporate behavior or performance. The interaction term is considered to capture 
such a phenomenon. 
The analysis also focuses on the JSC dummy used to examine the overall effect of the 
series of reforms that ensued from the 2014 introduction of the JSC. It is assumed here that the 
JSC dummy captures reform-related factors, whereas the year dummy in the model captures 
other factors common to firms, including macroeconomic factors. The analysis considers 
TSE-1 firms and the period from 2010 to 2018. A fixed-effects model is used for the estimation 
to control for firm-specific effects. It must be noted that causal relationships are not fully 
considered in the following analysis, and that some results may reflect reverse causality.
17
  
Table 9 summarizes the estimation results. Panel 1 shows the results for the models with 
the all institutional investor ownership ratio as the explanatory variable; Panel 2 shows the 
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 The estimation method used here does not completely eliminate the effects of investors’ 
preference for high-performing firms, firms that actively make high-risk investments, and firms 
with high shareholder returns. Future studies are needed to resolve this issue through more detailed 
analysis. 
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results for the models with the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio as the explanatory 
variable. 
 
--Table 9 about here-- 
 
For 2010 and subsequent years, the institutional investor ownership ratio has a significant 
positive association with ROA and operating profit margin. These results are consistent with 
the results of previous studies, including those by Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) who examined the relationship between the institutional investor ownership ratio 
and corporate performance in 27 countries. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
not statistically significant: the result does not show that the positive association between 
institutional investor ownership ratio and ROE was enhanced by the implementation of the JSC. 
The relationship between the institutional investor ownership ratio and ROE is positive but not 
statistically significant. The same result is observed for the models in which the foreign 
institutional investor ownership ratio is used in place of the institutional investor ownership 
ratio. Therefore, the analysis does not find evidence that firms with a higher institutional 
investor ownership ratio gained extra profitability due to the implementation of the JSC. 
Given that the institutional investor ownership ratio rose over the period being considered, 
we can calculate that the average increase in the institutional investor ownership ratio (8 
percentage points) and a one standard deviation increase in the ratio (16.5 percentage points) 
correspond to an increase in ROA by 0.13 and 0.39 percentage points, respectively. In other 
words, the increase in the institutional investor ownership ratio during the Abenomics period 
corresponds to about 10 percent of the 1.1 percentage point increase in ROA that occurred 
during the same period. Applying the same calculation to profit margin, we can see that the 
average increase in the institutional investor ownership ratio (8 percentage points) and a one 
standard deviation increase in the ratio correspond to an increase in profit margin by 0.19 and 
0.59 percentage points, respectively. That is, the increase in the institutional investor ownership 
ratio during the 2012-2017 period corresponds to more than 30 percent of the 1.75 percentage 
point increase in profit margin for the same period. 
Currently, the effects of the corporate governance reforms on investment are not 
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necessarily clear. There is a positive and significant association between capital expenditure 
and the institutional investor ownership ratio. The coefficient of the interaction term, however, 
is negative and significant. The results are similar for the foreign institutional investor 
ownership ratio (Panel 2). Taken together, these results imply that while capital expenditure 
tends to increase as the institutional investor ownership ratio increases, this tendency weakened 
after the implementation of the JSC.
18
 In addition, the institutional investor ownership ratio is 
not positively associated with M&A expenditure and R&D expenditure throughout the period 
considered in this analysis, even during the reform period. The above estimation results do not 
provide evidence that capital investment, M&A expenditure, and R&D expenditure clearly 
increased due to reforms, despite what was anticipated under Abenomics. 
While the relationship between the institutional investor ownership ratio and investment is 
not clear, the relationship between the institutional investor ownership ratio and payout is 
strong. The institutional investor ownership ratio is significantly positively associated with the 
ratio of total annual dividends to equity and with the ratio of total annual dividends plus stock 
buybacks to equity. Previous studies have found a similar tendency in the United States.
19
 The 
coefficient of the interaction term between the institutional investor ownership ratio and the 
JSC dummy is positive. In particular, it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the 
model whose dependent variable is the ratio of total annual dividends plus stock buybacks to 
equity. The coefficient of the interaction term is 0.013 whereas the coefficient of the 
institutional investor ownership ratio is 0.020, which suggests that the effect of the 
implementation of the JSC on profit allocation was quite substantial. A similar result is 
obtained for the models in which the overseas institutional investor ownership ratio is used in 
place of the institutional investor ownership ratio. It is therefore likely that, after 
implementation of the Code, the tendency for shareholder returns to increase with an 
increasing institutional investor ownership ratio became stronger. 
                                                   
18
 According to the study by Ferreira and Matos (2008), which analyzed the relationship between 
the institutional investor ownership ratio and capital investment, a firm with a higher institutional 
investor ownership ratio tends to have a lower level of capital investment. 
19
 There is, however, debate about the direction of causality. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argue 
that institutional investors prefer dividend-paying firms and firms making large stock buybacks, 
and that the existence of institutional investors does not lead to higher payouts by firms. In contrast, 
Crane et al. (2016) focused on stock index composition in their analysis and showed that 
institutional investor ownership is positively associated with dividend payouts. 
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The relationships of the institutional investor ownership ratio with financial leverage and 
with the ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets are both negative and significant. Contrary 
to what would normally be assumed, this result implies that firms with a high institutional 
investor ownership ratio were less dependent on debt; that is, they used their increased profit to 
reduce debt. For the model focusing on financial leverage, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is positive and significant, albeit at the 10 percent level, which implies that after the 
implementation of the JSC, increased institutional investor ownership reduced this tendency 
regarding debt. However, the estimated positive coefficient is small, and the overall effect of 
institutional investor ownership is still negative (-1.74 = -1.979 + 0.24). The coefficient of the 
JSC dummy is also negative and significant, which suggests that the corporate governance 
reforms did not mitigate the tendency for debt reduction. 
The coefficient for the relationship between the cash to assets ratio and the institutional 
investor ownership ratio is positive and significant, which shows that firms with a higher 
institutional investor ownership ratio are likely to have a higher cash ratio. The coefficient of 
the interaction term between the institutional investor ownership ratio and the JSC dummy and 
the coefficient of the interaction term between the foreign institutional investor ownership ratio 
and the JSC dummy are not statistically significant. The result implies that the corporate 
governance reforms were not strong enough to change the tendency of Japanese firms to hold 
on to their profits. Jidinger and Miyajima (2019) analyzed how firms use funds obtained 
through the sale of relational shareholdings and find evidence for increased holding of cash 
along with increased dividend payouts and increased stock buybacks, but no evidence of 
increased real investments. Their results are consistent with ours. 
The results presented above can be summarized as follows. Corporate governance reforms 
under Abenomics may have contributed to increased profits due to an increase in profit 
margins. The increased profits were not necessarily directed to investment, and some of the 
increased profits were used for payout and debt reduction with firms holding the rest as cash. 
 
 
7. Consequences of Abenomics: A Tentative Conclusion  
The year 2015 is often referred to as the first year of corporate governance in Japan. Yet 
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corporate governance reforms under Abenomics did not bring discontinous changes to 
corporate governance systems. Japanese corporate governance systems had already been 
evolving since the 1997 banking crisis. Japanese firms were once commonly characterized by 
the main bank system, cross-shareholding, and boards consisting of internally appointed 
directors. However, their reorganization efforts after the banking crisis separated hybrid firms, 
whose external governance systems had significantly shifted to market-based systems and had 
been combined with traditional relationship-based internal governance mechanisms, from 
traditional Japanese firms that continued to lag behind in terms of external and internal 
governance (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007). What kinds of changes, then, did the reforms bring 
to Japanese corporate governance systems?  
The series of reform measures implemented were significant because they encouraged 
institutional investors to exercise their voting rights and engage in corporate governance, 
strongly promoted board reforms, promoted effective capital use and reduction of 
cross-shareholdings by inducing firms to reexamine their “bedrock” relational shareholdings, 
and increased the attractiveness of the Japanese market, which led to increased investments 
from overseas. 
Comparison of the changes resulting from corporate governance reforms under 
Abenomics with results from the first peak of reforms following the banking crisis can be 
summarized as follows. Whereas earlier reforms introduced a hybrid structure into Japanese 
corporate governance systems and made these systems more diverse, the subsequent corporate 
governance reforms led to a further transition corporate governance structure into hybrid 
structure and promoted fine-tuning of hybrid governance systems. The reforms advanced the 
structural transition of governance systems at traditional Japanese firms that lagged behind in 
implementing reforms by promoting an increase in the institutional investor ownership ratio, 
reorganization of the board of directors, and elimination of relational shareholding (insider 
ownership). The reforms also induced firms whose governance systems had already had hybrid 
structure to fine-tune their systems through stock buybacks conducted in response to an 
increase in institutional investors, through adjustment of ownership structure (e.g., introduction 
of multiple-class shares), through an increase in independent outside directors, and through 
creation of optional committees. 
33 
 
 
Impacts on Corporate Behavior  
What effects did corporate governance reforms have on corporate behavior? Since the 
reforms are still in progress, we should wait a while before reaching a final conclusion. 
However, 4 to 5 years have already passed since the introduction of the JSC in 2014 and the 
CGC in 2015. We can therefore come to a tentative conclusion. 
Our analysis finds no evidence of the corporate governance reforms leading to increased 
corporate performance through institutional investors' increased influence or appointment of 
independent directors. However, if the reforms led to an increase in the institutional investor 
ownership ratio through improvement of the attractiveness of the Japanese market, then the 
reforms can be considered to have contributed, to some extent, to the increased corporate 
performance observed in 2013 and subsequent years through enhanced discipline in corporate 
management. At the same time, the reforms did not clearly succeed in directing increased 
profits during the Abenomics period to real economic activity. Our analysis shows that the 
positive relationship between institutional investor ownership and real investment weakened 
during the reform period and finds no clear evidence of institutional investor ownership 
influencing M&A and R&D expenditures. Our estimation results imply that the corporate 
governance reforms did not have an impact that was strong enough to change corporate 
managers’ attitudes toward risk and investment. 
The effects of corporate governance reforms on profit allocation can be clearly seen. After 
the reforms, the responsiveness of stock buybacks to the institutional investor ownership ratio 
increased by more than 60 percent and would further increase with consideration given to the 
institutional investor ownership ratio itself. The direct result of the reforms was increased 
allocation of profits to shareholders. Increased profits gained during the Abenomics period 
were also directed to debt reduction, and the corporate governance reforms did not sufficiently 
curb the phenomenon. The increased shareholder returns and debt reduction did not deplete 
firms' profits, which resulted in accumulation of cash and equivalents. 
In sum, the reforms under Abenomics were a powerful driving force behind making 
governance systems more shareholder-centric but have not succeeded in changing corporate 
managers’ attitudes toward risk in order to increase investments. Therefore, if a trickle-down 
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effect was expected as a way to equally distribute the benefits of the reforms to the public, this 
has not been sufficiently realized yet. 
It is too early to say that Abenomics has failed, or that pressure from myopic shareholders 
has intensified, based solely on the findings that corporate behavior has not sufficiently 
changed and shareholder returns have increased. It takes time for any reforms to change 
corporate behavior. Also, there has been no evidence of stock buybacks being used for 
increased compensation, as discussed by Almeida et al. (2016) in the context of the U.S. 
market, and increased shareholder returns have not substantially reduced real investment. It is 
true, however, that the vision of Abenomics has not been realized as anticipated.
20
 In order for 
the Japanese economy to grow in the future, we need to prudently examine what should be 
expected of corporate governance reforms and how the reforms should be complemented by 
other policies.
21
 
  
                                                   
20
 If one divides the sample into two samples based on corporate growth potential and estimates the 
models shown in Table 9 with the new samples, the positive effects of institutional investor 
ownership on the responsiveness of dividend payouts is larger for firms with low growth potential. 
21
 Also, our estimation results may imply that it is time we need to consider how to prevent abuse 
of shareholder rights that sacrifices long-term investment (e.g., R&D and human capital 
investment). 
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Table 1: Major events related to corporate governance reforms under Abenomics 
 
Dec. 2012 Formation of the Second Abe Cabinet  
 Establishment of the Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization 
Feb. 2013 ISS recommended voting against the appointment of a top executive “if the board 
after the shareholder meeting does not include at least one outsider, regardless of 
independence.” 
Jun.2013     The Japan Revitalization Strategy put forth the principles to be followed by 
institutional investors in fulfilling their fiduciary duty (e.g., encouraging firms 
through dialogue to pursue medium- to long-term growth). 
Jun. 2013 Toyota’s general shareholder meeting; three outside directors selected. Kyocera, 
Sumitomo Corporation, and FANUC followed suit. 
Jan. 2014 Start of the JPX400 index 
Canon announced the appointment of outside directors. 
Feb. 2014 Creation of the JSC 
Jun. 2014 Revision of Japan Revitalization Strategy. It put forth enhanced corporate 
governance as part of the Emergency Structural Reform Program. 
Aug. 2014 Ito Report, “Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth: Building 
Favorable Relationships between Companies and Investors” 
 Dai-ichi Life decided to disclose voting results. 
Oct. 2014 Revision of ISS proxy voting policies (ROE criterion, board composition, creation 
of an audit committee). 
Mar. 2015 The Financial Services Agency and the Tokyo Stock Exchange announced the first 
draft of corporate governance guidelines. 
May 2015 Amendment of the Companies Act (audit and supervisory committee; explanation 
for not establishing the committee; stricter requirements for outside directors) 
Jun. 2015 Mizuho Bank announced further dissolution of cross-shareholding. 
2015 Revision of the Japan Revitalization Strategy 
 Implementation of the CGC 
Jun. 2016 Japan Revitalization Strategy 2016; shift of reforms from formality to substance 
Dec. 2016 The JSC adopted by 214 financial institutions. 
Mar. 2017 CGS Study Group's first-term report 
May 2017 Revised JSC (disclosure of detailed voting results) 
Jun. 2017 The GPIF published its voting principles and requested institutions entrusted with 
asset management to disclose detailed voting results. 
 Future Investment Strategy 2017 (Cabinet decision) 
Aug. 2017 Corporate governance reports; description on the treatment of retired 
representative directors 
Dec. 2017 CGS Study Group, second term; follow-up conference; group governance 
Mar. 2018 Revision of the CGC 
Jun. 2018 Future Investment Strategy 2018; operational guidelines for group governance 
Nov. 2018 Creation of the Study Group on Fair M&A 
Jun. 2019 Operational guidelines on group governance                              
1) ISS 2013 Japan Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines 
(https://www.issgovernance.com/file/2013-policies/2013ISSJapanGuidelinesSummaryRev01312013.pdf) 
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Table 2: Guidelines for voting (selected financial institutions) 
 
   
 Name of 
institution 
Criteria for voting against appointment of a director 
Proxy advisory firm ISS Average ROE for the past 5 years below 5% and no prospect of 
improvement 
Trust banks 
 
Sumitomo Mitsui   
Trust Bank 
ROE in the bottom quartile among TOPIX firms in three consecutive 
periods 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Trust and Banking 
ROE below 5% in five consecutive periods and no prospect of improvement 
Asset Management 
One 
ROE below in the lowest tertile among TSE-1 firms in three consecutive 
periods 
Investment trust 
asset management 
firms 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Asset Management 
ROE below the listed firm mean, the median, or 5% in the most recent three 
periods 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Trust Asset 
Management 
ROE below 5% in the past three consecutive periods 
Nomura Asset 
Management 
ROE below 5% and below the industry median in the most recent three 
consecutive periods; no management efforts for improvement observed (see 
note) 
Tokio Marine Asset 
Management 
ROE below 5% in the past three consecutive periods 
 Resona Asset 
Management 
Vote against a representative director serving 3 years or more at an 
inefficiently managed firm (ROE below 5% in three consecutive periods) 
with ROE in the bottom 25% in the industry in 3 consecutive years (10% in 
recent periods), if no rational, convincing explanation is provided. 
Life insurance 
company 
Dai-ichi Life Operating loss (consolidated) in the most recent three consecutive periods; 
ordinary loss (consolidated) in the most recent three consecutive periods; 
net loss (consolidated) in the most recent three consecutive periods 
   
  Allocation of surplus 
Trust bank 
 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Trust and 
Banking 
Vote against, in principle, if average ROE for the past 3 years and most 
recent ROE are below 5%, if the need for internal reserves is low, and if the 
total return ratio is below 30%. 
 Vote against, in principle, if (cash and equivalents + long- and short-term 
securities) / total assets is 50% or higher, if average ROE for the past three 
years and the most recent ROE are below 8%, and if requested explanations 
from the firm on its capital policy are deemed insufficient. 
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Table 3: Institutional ownership of TSE-1 firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P anel 1: Institutional ow nership
2010 2012 2014 2017
C hange from
2012 to 2017
M ean 19.5% 19.8% 23.3% 27.8% 8.0%
M edian 16.0% 16.4% 20.4% 25.6% 9.3%
Standard deviation 15.4% 15.6% 16.2% 16.5%
C oefficient of variation 0.790 0.788 0.694 0.592
Q uintiles of m arket value of equity at the end of each year
First quintile
M ean 6.0% 6.5% 8.9% 13.1% 6.6%
M edian 2.7% 4.9% 7.4% 11.3% 6.4%
Standard deviation 6.4% 6.6% 7.6% 8.5%
Second quintile
M ean 12.1% 11.7% 15.1% 20.4% 8.6%
M edian 9.9% 9.5% 14.0% 18.6% 9.2%
Standard deviation 9.8% 9.1% 10.3% 11.7%
Third quintile
M ean 17.4% 18.2% 22.3% 27.9% 9.7%
M edian 15.6% 17.1% 21.2% 26.6% 9.5%
Standard deviation 10.3% 11.0% 12.1% 13.0%
Fourth quintile
M ean 26.5% 26.9% 30.0% 34.0% 7.1%
M edian 25.3% 26.7% 29.7% 33.6% 6.9%
Standard deviation 12.5% 13.3% 13.1% 14.5%
Fifth quintile
M ean 36.9% 37.2% 40.7% 44.6% 7.4%
M edian 36.2% 37.8% 41.1% 45.6% 7.8%
Standard deviation 13.8% 13.8% 13.4% 13.5%
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P anel 2：Foreign institutional ow nership
2010 2012 2014 2017
C hange from
2012 to 2017
M ean 11.4% 12.2% 15.2% 16.8% 4.7%
M edian 7.8% 8.8% 12.5% 15.0% 6.2%
Standard deviation 10.9% 11.2% 12.1% 12.0%
C oefficient of variation 0.959 0.926 0.799 0.712
Q uintiles of m arket value of equity at the end of each year
First quintile
M ean 2.7% 3.2% 4.5% 6.1% 2.9%
M edian 1.4% 1.7% 3.1% 4.5% 2.9%
Standard deviation 4.1% 4.7% 4.8% 5.4%
Second quintile
M ean 5.9% 6.0% 8.5% 11.0% 5.0%
M edian 3.7% 4.2% 6.6% 9.7% 5.5%
Standard deviation 6.6% 6.0% 6.9% 8.0%
Third quintile
M ean 9.2% 10.5% 14.2% 17.1% 6.5%
M edian 7.3% 8.7% 12.7% 15.9% 7.2%
Standard deviation 7.1% 7.8% 9.1% 9.7%
Fourth quintile
M ean 15.2% 15.9% 19.6% 21.2% 5.3%
M edian 13.8% 14.5% 19.1% 21.0% 6.5%
Standard deviation 8.8% 9.5% 9.8% 10.1%
Fifth quintile
M ean 24.0% 25.2% 28.9% 29.2% 4.0%
M edian 23.5% 24.3% 29.1% 28.4% 4.1%
Standard deviation 10.8% 11.1% 10.5% 10.5%
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Table 4: Characteristics of board of directors 
 
2013 2018 2013 2018 2013 2018
M ean num ber of directors 8.6 9.2 10.4 10.6 8.1 8.8
M ean num ber of outside directors 1.2 2.7 1.8 3.3 1.0 2.5
N um ber of outside directors =  0（％） 37.6% 0.3% 24.3% 0.0% 41.3% 0.4%
N um ber =  1（％） 31.7% 5.1% 26.1% 1.3% 33.2% 6.0%
N um ber =  2（％） 17.1% 49.4% 22.5% 31.1% 15.6% 53.7%
N um ber =  3（％） 13.7% 45.2% 27.2% 67.7% 9.9% 39.9%
N um ber =  3 or m ore（％） 12.3% 41.8% 17.8% 46.4% 10.8% 40.7%
C om pany w ith nom inating com m ittee （％） 2.5% 2.9% 6.0% 8.8% 1.5% 1.5%
C om pany w ith audit and supervisory com m ittee （％） - 24.4% - 15.0% - 26.6%
C om pany w ith voluntary nom inating com m ittee （％） 5.9% 31.4% 14.6% 52.4% 3.5% 26.5%
C om pany w ith voluntary com pensation com m ittee （％） 8.6% 34.9% 19.1% 54.9% 5.7% 30.2%
TSE1 firm s JP X400 firm s N on-JP X400 firm s
D ata source：Tokyo Stock Exchange, Yakuin Shikiho(D irectory of directors) published byToyo K eizai Shinposha
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Table 5: The effect of outside directors on corporate performance 
 
Time ＝
-0.179 -0.059 -0.110 -2.686 ** -2.120 -2.809 *
(0.303) (0.215) (0.150) (1.181) (1.366) (1.491)
0.233 *** 0.219 ** 0.239 *
(0.080) (0.107) (0.133)
-0.026 -0.041 *** -0.023
(0.019) (0.015) (0.021)
0.028 0.011 0.013
(0.019) (0.038) (0.033)
0.461 0.165 -0.350 -5.816 -2.589 -7.049 ***
(0.793) (0.350) (0.253) (4.896) (3.237) (1.992)
0.660 * 0.338 0.584 ***
(0.390) (0.282) (0.166)
-0.057 -0.077 *** -0.029
(0.037) (0.025) (0.023)
0.080 0.036 0.085 **
(0.062) (0.045) (0.037)
-0.010 -0.012 0.007 -0.435 ** -0.290 -0.310
(0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.199) (0.186) (0.219)
0.032 * 0.024 0.022
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
-0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
0.006 0.008 * 0.016 **
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
・In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level.
-1 to 1 -1 to 2 -1 to 3
ROA
Δnumber of outside
directors
-1 to 1 -1 to 2 -1 to 3
 x LN(Sales）
 x Foreign ownership
 x Managerial ownership
 x Foreign ownership
 x Managerial ownership
ROE
Δnumber of outside
directors
 x LN(Sales）
 x Foreign ownership
 x Managerial ownership
Tobin's q
Δnumber of outside
directors
 x LN(Sales）
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Table 6: Comparative statistics of companies before corporate governance reforms 
 
Note: These data contain average data on all companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and was constructed using information from Nikkei Cges. 
Given the lack of data on relational shareholding, we used FY2016 as a conditional base year, which means that for the period 2005 until 2014, each 
company that falls within the top 25% (above the 75th percentile) is recognized as 1 and that each company in the bottom 25% (below the 25th percentile) 
is recognized as 0. Using these constraints, we then measure the difference between the top 25% and bottom 25% companies for each year before the CG 
reform in 2015. The thresholds for relational shareholding asset size to total assets is 0.87% for the bottom 25% and 6.38% for the top 25. The 
cross-shareholding ratio, however, is 0.1% for the bottom 25% and more than or equal to 14.2% for the top 25%.  
 
 
 TSE Relational shareholding T-test of means Cross shareholding T-test of means 
 Top 25 Bottom 25 (Top - Bottom) Top 25 Bottom 25 (Top - Bottom) 
ROA 5,89% 5,22% 7,19% -1,96%*** 4,62% 8,68% -4,05%*** 
Cash Flow 6,20% 5,69% 7,40% -1,71%*** 5,36% 8,15% -2,78%*** 
Tobin's Q 1,16 1,05 1,30 -0,25%*** 1,00 1,48 -0,48*** 
Domestic Institutional Shareholder 22.89% 22,67% 24,47% -1,8%*** 19,89% 22,40% -2,51%*** 
Foreign Institutional Shareholder 13,72% 12,82% 15,80 -2,97%*** 10,89% 15,13% -4,24%*** 
Leverage 52,71% 48,31% 55,09 -6,77%*** 52,82% 50,29% 2,53%*** 
Total Assets (JPY Billion) 934,956 500,000 460,000 40,000 350,000 910,000 -560,000*** 
Market Cap. (JPY Billion) 222,723 160,000 230,000 -70,000*** 150,000 210,000 -60,000*** 
R&D to Total Sales 1.85% 2,60% 2,97% -0,37%*** 2,14% 2,57% -0,43%*** 
Capex to Fixed Assets 14.19% 13,05% 16,73% -3,68%*** 13,65% 18,16% -4,51%*** 
M&A to total assets 0.28% 0,24% 0,45% -0,21%*** 0,20% 0,46% -0,26%*** 
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Table 7: The yearly decision on Relationship Shareholding 
 
The first row A addresses the aggregate dataset for all 200 randomly selected companies. The second row B assesses the data provided from each company on each 
specific relationship shareholding and is the total number of assets held for all 200 companies. In the third panel, we address the average total number of decisions 
taken to sell the Relationship Shareholding assets for all 200 companies as well as the total number of shareholdings. The decision to sell is determined when a 
company chooses to decrease or liquidate an acquired Relationship Shareholding asset. The total number of decisions taken to sell a Relationship Shareholding asset 
is the aggregate of the previously explained term.  
 
 Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
A A. Number of Companies in the Dataset 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
B. Total Decisions to sell 57 72 57 80 101 150 178 
(B) / (A) (%) 29% 36% 29% 40% 51% 75% 89% 
         B A. Total Number of relationship assets held by 200 companies 4948 5006 5083 5183 5082 5125 5151 
B. Decisions to sell 330 347 326 337 482 737 1073 
(B) / (A) (%) 7% 7% 6% 7% 9% 14% 21% 
         C Number of Decisions taken to sell assets 2.74 2.89 2.84 2.69 3.35 4.31 5.79 
Total Number of shares held (Millions) 26.3 25.5 26.9 26.8 27.1 24.1 21.2 
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Table 8: Average firm characteristics of TSE1 firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R O E R O A
N et incom e to
sales
O perating
incom e to
sales
Sales to
assets
A ssets to
equity
D ebt to
assets
D ividend to
equity
P ayout to
equity
C A P EX  to
fixed assets
A cquisition to
assets
R & D  to sales
C ash to
assets
Institutional
ow nership
Foreign
institutional
ow nership
2000 0.012 0.060 0.015 0.058 1.014 3.753 0.266 0.013 0.017 0.136 0.001 0.025 0.188 N A 0.070
2001 -0.008 0.047 0.004 0.045 1.029 3.571 0.258 0.013 0.019 0.129 0.001 0.027 0.186 N A 0.067
2002 0.018 0.055 0.013 0.053 1.066 3.473 0.246 0.013 0.021 0.119 0.001 0.027 0.191 N A 0.065
2003 0.049 0.062 0.026 0.060 1.078 3.232 0.224 0.131 0.020 0.122 0.001 0.027 0.197 N A 0.089
2004 0.064 0.070 0.033 0.067 1.111 3.006 0.210 0.015 0.021 0.145 0.001 0.026 0.202 0.208 0.108
2005 0.062 0.071 0.035 0.068 1.115 2.814 0.192 0.016 0.022 0.161 0.001 0.025 0.187 0.233 0.131
2006 0.070 0.072 0.037 0.069 1.126 2.752 0.185 0.018 0.026 0.172 0.002 0.024 0.188 0.227 0.137
2007 0.061 0.073 0.033 0.067 1.181 2.721 0.188 0.021 0.030 0.170 0.002 0.024 0.187 0.221 0.134
2008 -0.016 0.052 0.004 0.044 1.195 2.883 0.215 0.024 0.036 0.157 0.002 0.027 0.199 0.217 0.112
2009 0.015 0.048 0.012 0.043 1.089 2.746 0.209 0.018 0.023 0.120 0.002 0.028 0.229 0.194 0.112
2010 0.054 0.065 0.029 0.061 1.139 2.697 0.200 0.018 0.023 0.126 0.002 0.026 0.248 0.195 0.114
2011 0.050 0.063 0.028 0.059 1.131 2.622 0.193 0.019 0.024 0.140 0.003 0.027 0.254 0.196 0.114
2012 0.058 0.064 0.033 0.059 1.112 2.542 0.189 0.019 0.024 0.159 0.003 0.027 0.272 0.198 0.123
2013 0.075 0.070 0.041 0.066 1.121 2.437 0.179 0.019 0.024 0.168 0.003 0.025 0.275 0.222 0.141
2014 0.073 0.071 0.044 0.068 1.098 2.337 0.175 0.019 0.026 0.169 0.003 0.025 0.280 0.233 0.152
2015 0.074 0.073 0.043 0.072 1.111 2.317 0.177 0.022 0.031 0.174 0.003 0.025 0.297 0.254 0.155
2016 0.079 0.073 0.047 0.073 1.076 2.294 0.176 0.023 0.032 0.172 0.004 0.026 0.307 0.260 0.160
2017 0.086 0.075 0.051 0.077 1.073 2.256 0.170 0.024 0.031 0.172 0.004 0.025 0.311 0.278 0.168
2018 0.081 0.075 0.051 0.078 1.083 2.230 0.167 0.026 0.035 0.191 0.004 0.025 0.327 N A N A
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Table 9: The effects of institutional ownership on firm performance and behavior 
Panel A: Institutional ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
V ariables R O E R O A
O perating
incom e to
sales
P ayout to
equity
D ividend
to equity
C A P EX  to
fixed
assets
A cquisitio
n to
assets
R & D  to
sales
D ebt to
assets
C ash to
assets
Institutional ow nership 0.024 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.092*** 0.001 0.004* -0.116*** 0.025**
(0.021) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012)
Institutional ow nership×JSC  dum m y 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.015*** 0.003** -0.058*** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.016*
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009)
JSC  dum m y -0.007 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.002* -0.002*** 0.033*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.042*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
LN (assets） 0.045*** 0.009** 0.028*** -0.003 0.004*** 0.046*** 0.006*** -0.003* 0.100*** -0.015**
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006)
Foreign sales to total sales -0.020 0.012* -0.002 -0.003 -0.003* 0.019 -0.004 0.001 0.010 -0.007
(0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.012)
D ebt to assets -0.304*** -0.145*** -0.136*** 0.026*** -0.006** -0.011 0.015*** -0.001 -0.138***
(0.032) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016)
C ash to assets -0.022*** -0.007*** -0.171*** -0.020*** 0.006* -0.157***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
C ash flow  to assets 0.044*** 0.009 0.207*** 0.005 -0.039*** -0.508*** 0.052**
(0.011) (0.005) (0.055) (0.004) (0.005) (0.032) (0.026)
Tobin's q 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept -0.706*** -0.069 -0.421*** 0.066* -0.049*** -0.701*** -0.112*** 0.084*** -1.540*** 0.465***
(0.175) (0.064) (0.067) (0.036) (0.018) (0.236) (0.018) (0.032) (0.141) (0.115)
Y ear dum m y Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
Firm  dum m y Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
O bservations 15,456 15,456 15,448 15,322 15,322 15,299 15,299 9,689 15,322 15,322
R -squared 0.053 0.111 0.117 0.058 0.129 0.027 0.031 0.049 0.231 0.068
N um ber of firm s 1,982 1,982 1,982 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,252 1,964 1,964
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
・In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level.
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Panel B: Foreign institutional ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
V ariables R O E R O A
O perating
incom e to
sales
P ayout to
equity
D ividend
to equity
C A P EX  to
fixed
assets
A cquisitio
n to
assets
R & D  to
sales
D ebt to
assets
C ash to
assets
Foreign institutional ow nership -0.012 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.156*** 0.006 0.005 -0.217*** 0.065***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.004) (0.046) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.020)
-0.001 -0.010 -0.005 0.021*** 0.005** -0.087*** 0.001 0.001 0.011 -0.018
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.012)
JSC  dum m y -0.006 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.002* -0.002*** 0.030*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.040*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
LN (assets） 0.048*** 0.010*** 0.029*** -0.003 0.004*** 0.046*** 0.006*** -0.003* 0.101*** -0.017***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006)
Foreign sales to total sales -0.019 0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003** 0.016 -0.005* 0.001 0.014
(0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
D ebt to assets -0.309*** -0.147*** -0.138*** 0.026*** -0.007** -0.006 0.015*** -0.001 -0.134***
(0.032) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016)
C ash to assets -0.023*** -0.008*** -0.173*** -0.020*** 0.005 -0.151***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
C ash flow  to assets 0.047*** 0.010* 0.210*** 0.005 -0.039*** -0.514*** 0.053**
(0.011) (0.005) (0.056) (0.004) (0.005) (0.032) (0.026)
Tobin's q 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept -0.744*** -0.095 -0.439*** 0.067* -0.054*** -0.702*** -0.109*** 0.084*** -1.550*** 0.487***
(0.174) (0.065) (0.067) (0.036) (0.018) (0.239) (0.018) (0.032) (0.141) (0.114)
Y ear dum m y Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
Firm  dum m y Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
O bservations 15,456 15,456 15,448 15,322 15,322 15,299 15,299 9,689 15,322 15,322
R -squared 0.053 0.106 0.114 0.057 0.123 0.027 0.032 0.049 0.237 0.069
N um ber of firm s 1,982 1,982 1,982 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,252 1,964 1,964
・In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Foreign institutional ow nership
×JSC  dum m y
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Figure 1: Board composition from 1997 to 2016 
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Figure 2: The Ownership Ratio of Insiders (Banks, Corporation, and Insurance Firms) from 
1970 to 2017 
 
Source: Based on the Survey of Shareholders, TSE. 
 
 
 
